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his article investigates hypotheses generated by the veto players' theory. The fundamental insight of this theory is that an increase in the number of veto players (for all practical purposes, in parliamentary systems the number of parties in government) and their ideological distance from one another will reduce the ability of both government and parliament to produce significant laws. In addition, the number of significant laws increases with the duration of a government and with an increase in the ideological difference between current and previous government. These propositions are tested with legislative data (both laws and government decrees) on working time and working conditions identified in two legislative sources: the NA TLEX computerized database in Geneva (produced by the International Labour organization) and Blanpain's International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations. The data cover fifteen West European countries for the period 1981-91. The evidence corroborates the proposed hypotheses. P arty systems have traditionally been the fundamental variable of political analysis (Duverger [1954 (Duverger [ ] 1969 Lijphart 1984; Sartori 1976 ). On the basis of the party system of a country (roughly speaking, the number of parties in parliament and the ideological distances among them), one expects to see systematic differences regarding the relationship between parliament and government (executive dominance) as well as differences in the nature of politics (i.e., whether the system is polarized or moderate). Recently, an alternative middle-range theory was proposed. According to this theory, the fundamental political differences between countries are generated by the number of veto players (individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo) (Tsebelis 1995a (Tsebelis , 1995b .
The veto players' theory differs in two major respects from the middle-range theories in comparative politics mentioned above (in addition to having different independent variables).' First, it is policy consequential. That is, it takes policy outcomes as its primary concern and works its way backward to institutional and partisan characteristics that are responsible for the production of specific policy outcomes. Other theories result in classifications or typologies (Lange and Meadwell 1985) . They make distinctions (two-and multiparty systems, presidential and parliamentary regimes, cadre and mass parties, and so on) without relating them to policy differences. Second, the veto players' theory applies the same framework of analysis to presidential and to parliamentary regimes, to two-and to multiparty systems, and to unicameral and to bicameral legislatures. In fact, in countries where veto powers are exercised by other players, such as the president (Portugal, presidential regimes) or the second chamber (Germany most of the time, the United States, Switzerland), the number of veto players is increased and the framework applied accordingly.2 Among other middle-range theories, only Lijphart's consociationalism has the same range of applicability. Lijphart reaches different conclusions, however. For example, he classifies the United States along with the United Kingdom as majoritarian countries, falling at the opposite end of the spectrum from Italy,3 which represents a consensus democracy. According to the veto players' theory, the United States and Italy are categorized together as countries with multiple veto players, while the United Kingdom is distinct, as it has only one veto player.
The veto players' theory predicts that policy stability (defined as the impossibility of significant change of the status quo) will be the result of large coalition governments, particularly if the coalition partners have significant ideological differences among them. In turn, policy stability can be linked to a series of other political phenomena. As a result of this policy stability (that is, the inability to adapt to exogenous shocks), coalition governments will be short lived. A similar argument can be made about regime stability in presidential systems. Because the regime cannot adapt to 2 For the counting rules, see Tsebelis 1995a. 3This is the classification in Democracies (Lijphart 1984) ; subsequently, Lijphart introduced a second axis (federalism) to his analysis. The United Kingdom and the United States differ along this axis. Yet, even in this classification, Italy does not resemble the United States (if anything, the difference increases because now they differ in two dimensions as opposed to one). sudden changes of the status quo, it may fall. In addition, if a government is unable to produce significant laws (policy stability), the judiciary may step in and play a more important role in countries with a coalition government than in countries with a singleparty government. Furthermore, bureaucracies may be more independent during coalition rule than under single-party government.
Let me situate the argument proposed and tested here with respect to three different streams of relevant arguments. The first is the "divided government" literature in American politics. Some researchers (Fiorina 1992; Sundquist 1988 ) maintain that divided government will cause a reduction in significant legislation. The argument is very similar to the one proposed here, because divided government means that two of the veto players have significantly different preferences. Yet, empirical evidence collected by Mayhew (1991) on significant laws does not corroborate the divided government expectation.4 Mayhew finds no significant difference in legislation between periods of unified and divided government. Does this finding falsify the veto players' theory presented here?
The difference between Mayhew's findings and those I present below is that my analysis pertains to majoritarian institutions, while in the American political system one of the veto players (the Senate) is supermajoritarian. Let me clarify the difference that makes to the veto players' argument.5 In the U.S. Senate, individual senators can filibuster (talk nonstop in order to prevent a vote on a bill), and a three-fifths vote is required for cloture. It follows that for every important bill a -minority of 41 senators can block the vote on the floor of the Senate. In order for a significant bill to pass, the required support is 60 votes (qualified majority), not 51 (simple majority). It so happens that historical cases of the minority party controlling fewer than 41 seats do not exist after 1979 (the three-fifths rule was introduced in 1975). Consequently, all significant bills have to pass through the Senate with some level of bipartisan support. This means that divided government is built into U.S. institutions not because of the requirement that all three veto players agree on a particular change of the status quo but because of the filibuster rule, which essentially prevents partisan legislation from passing the Senate. How about bipartisan legislation? It will pass the Senate (and the House) and is unlikely to be vetoed by the president regardless of his party. In the unlikely occasion that a president vetoes such legislation, the two chambers are likely to have the two-thirds majority required to override. Thus, the supermajoritarian nature of decision making in the Senate explains the peculiarity of U.S. results and places them in comparative perspective. ). According to this argument, the larger the number of veto players, the more likely is each to ask for special favors for his or her constituency as a condition for supporting legislation, and the higher the deficit or inflation rate will be. This views veto players as a collective action problem, which neither reinforces nor contradicts the argument presented here. For example, according to the collective-action argument, oversized coalitions will have higher deficits or inflation than minimum winning coalitions. According to my argument, oversized coalitions will be locked into the previous policy pattern (whatever that pattern happens to be).
Finally, a third stream identifies or tests parts of the veto players' argument as presented in this article (as well as Tsebelis 1995a, 1995b). With regard to policy stability, Bawn (N.d.), in an elegant article on government spending in Germany, categorizes issues as favored by the Socialists (pro-SPD) or by the Christian Democrats (pro-CDU/CSU), and she demonstrates that participation by the SPD in the Grand Coalition in 1966 had as a consequence a significant increase in pro-SPD spending, but this spending remained constant in 1969, despite the fact that the SPD became the main party in a coalition government with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). This finding is consistent with both Bawn's hypothesis that the FDP seeks to reduce spending and the veto players' theory. Similarly, Hallerberg and Basinger (1998), in an empirical article on one significant area of legislation-the reduction of business and highest income personal taxation in advanced industrialized countries, 1986-90-discovered that tax reduction was more decisive in countries with a single-party government (whether of the Right or the Left). Kreppel (1997) found legislative output in Italy negatively correlated with the number of parties in government.
Robert Franzese (1996) , in an analysis of budget deficits in advanced industrialized countries, concludes that countries with many veto players are locked into the same deficit pattern (i.e., the ones with high debt have high deficits, such as Italy, while the ones with low debt have low deficits, such as Switzerland). In contrast, countries with a single-party government (whether majority or minority) can move away from preexisting patterns (i.e., they have high or low deficits, regardless of the level of their debt). Franzese's study can be considered a crucial experiment between my veto players' theory and the collective-action view. Similarly, Daniel Treisman (1998) studied both advanced and developing countries and found that federal countries (i.e., many veto players) are locked into patterns of high (developing nations) or low (advanced nations) inflation. Finally, most of the chapters and certainly the introduction and conclusion of Do Institutions Matter? (Weaver and Rockman 1993) claim that countries with a multiparty parliamentary system respond to exogenous shocks in a way similar to countries with a presidential system, a finding also consistent found that the ideological distance between government partners has a negative effect on the duration of government coalitions in parliamentary democracies. The conventional wisdom on coalitions was that characteristics of the parliament (number of parties, ideological distance among them) affect the duration of coalitions, because partners look at the situation in parliament to calculate their probabilities of participating in a new government (see Laver and Schofield 1990 for an overview). Warwick included both government and parliament variables in the same regression; it turns out that only the government characteristics (ideological distance between government partners) mattered, exactly as the veto players' theory predicts.
Nicos Alivizatos (1995) studied the importance of the judiciary and found that the most active judges are in the countries with many veto players, exactly as Tsebelis (1995a) expects. Similarly, Bednar, Ferejohn, and Garrett (1996) , who examined the activism of the European Court of Justice, find that the introduction of qualified majority voting in the European Council (which reduces the number of veto players in European institutions) led to a significant reduction in judicial activism. Examining one particular bureaucracy (the German Bundesbank), Lohmann (1998) found that bureaucratic independence increases during periods of opposing majorities in the upper and lower houses (Bundestag and Bundesrat) of the German parliament. Her findings are also consistent with expectations generated by the veto players' theory.
This article makes a direct and cross-national test of the first and most important prediction generated by the veto players' theory: that the number of significant laws produced by a coalition government, particularly if there are important ideological differences among government partners, is significantly lower than the number of significant laws produced by single-party government or by coalitions with partners that agree. This prediction has not been tested so far directly and cross-nationally because of the difficulty of identifying significant laws across different countries in a consistent way.7 That obstacle has been overcome by the work of Doering (1995b) and his team. I will revisit the articles in which the veto players' theory was introduced, extract their predictions, and then test these predictions using a new data set of significant laws on issues of working time and working conditions provided by Doering.
The article is organized into three parts. The first provides a simple model that adapts the veto players' theory (which is designed for multidimensional spaces) to one dimension (the traditional Left-Right political spectrum). This model predicts that an increase in the ideological distance among coalition partners adversely affects the number of significant laws enacted in a country. The second section presents the data set, 7Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) that has an upper house endowed with veto powers and that is not controlled by the same parties as the lower house is Germany (for some of the period under examination). Consequently, in Germany for the periods that the upper house (Bundesrat) is controlled by a different party than the lower house (Bundestag), I add one veto player to the parties in government. Indeed, during these periods, the parties in government are hostages to the opposition party and have to secure its approval in order to pass legislation.
The head of state has no veto powers in West European countries. This statement is true not only in the cases of royalty but also for elected heads of state who are considered strong, such as the French or the Finnish president. There are two exceptions in my data set. First, the Portuguese president is endowed with veto power over legislation (an attempt to modify the constitution in this respect in 1982 failed). Consequently, whenever the president has different preferences from the governing coalition, I include one additional veto player to the calculations for Portugal.9 Second, the French president has veto power over 8 Using Lijphart's (1984) terminology, bicameralism in the first set of countries is "congruent," while in the second set it is "asymmetric"; in both cases it is "weak." Tsebelis and Money (1997) have demonstrated that, even in these cases, upper houses certainly influence and sometimes even abort legislation. But cases of abortion are the exception rather than the rule, so we will ignore it here. 9 Characterizing the political beliefs of General Eanes, who was in power in the first part of the period I examine, was difficult. I assimilated him with the Socialist Party, which supported his election. The problem was not repeated with Soares, who was actually a Socialist. government decrees. There was one case in the data set when the president was supported by a different majority than the government in the data set, and in this case I increased the number of veto players by one.
In all other cases, veto players are the government partners in a parliamentary system. This statement holds on the average in the case of oversized as well as minority governments. In the case of oversized government, the agreement of all government parties is formally not necessary for legislation to be approved. By the definition of "oversized," some parties can be ignored, and legislation still can be accepted by a majority in parliament. What is formally possible may not be politically feasible, however. Trying to pass legislation against the will of minor government partners may lead to a crisis and the resignation of the government (Tsebelis 1995a). Consequently, if the passage of legislation is so important for some parties and so damaging for others, a different government would have to enact this legislation (after the dissident parties cause the government to fall).
The case of minority governments requires more explanation. The predominant belief is that a minority government corresponds to some kind of divided government in a presidential system and that legislation requires the agreement of both government and parliament to be enacted (Laver and Shepsle 1996) . My argument is that the conventional wisdom is formally true, but the dynamics of a parliamentary system work differently. Minority governments are equipped with significant positional and institutional weapons that enable them (most of the time) to impose their will on parliament, just as majority governments do. The positional advantage is the location of the government party. This party is usually at the center of the political system.10 As a consequence, it can lean slightly one way or another and find allies ready to support different pieces of legislation. The institutional advantages of a government are the control it has over the parliamentary agenda (Doering 1995c). As Doering demonstrates, there are a variety of such advantages in each country. Yet, one advantage is common to governments in all parliamentary systems: the question of confidence (Huber 1996) . This weapon enables the prime minister to transform a vote on a piece of legislation into a vote for or against the government under the threat of resignation and possible new elections. Consequently, it places the opponents of a particular law under significant pressure, which enables the government effectively to control the agenda.
The conclusion of this analysis is that, in parliamentary systems, veto players are (with the exceptions mentioned above) the partners in a government coalition. The more partners there are in government, the more difficult it becomes to induce a significant change. In fact, if one defines the concept of the winset of the status quo as the set of points that are preferred over the status quo-by the veto players, then the following 10 Laver and Schofield (1990) call this position the "core" and argue that such a configuration is frequent with minority governments. A similar point is made by Strom (1990) . 594 two propositions can be proven (see Tsebelis 1995b, 297-301).11 PROPOSITION 1: As the number of veto players increases, the winset of the status quo does not increase (i.e., policy stability does not decrease).
PROPOSITION 2: As the distance among veto players increases along the same line, the winset of the status quo does not increase (i.e., policy stability does not decrease).
From propositions 1 and 2, 1 will produce a corollary about the relationship between the number of veto players and the ideological distance among them in a single dimension. This adaptation is necessary because the data set I analyze is in one dimension (the traditional Left-Right dimension of West European politics).
Figure 1 offers a graphic representation of a threeparty government and the status quo (previous legislation in an area). Note that the three parties in government are located on a straight line. This is a restriction that I impose in order to analyze the available (onedimensional) data. From this restriction certain interesting modifications follow of the original multidimensional model. Note also that the status quo legislation is not necessarily located on the same line, since in general a particular piece of legislation may address other issues as well as the subject matter of this study (labor legislation). In this sense, the "in one dimension" in the title of this section refers only to the position of the parties. Strictly speaking, the model is two dimensional, with the restriction that parties fall along one single dimension, while the status quo can be anywhere.
In Figure 1 , the three circles indicate the areas that each party prefers over the status quo. What the coalition can do is presented inside the intersection of all three circles (the heavily shaded lens in the figure). Let us now examine two possible coalition-building processes, step by step. Assume that parties 1 and 2 get together first, and they invite party 3 to join them later. What parties 1 and 2 could do in order to change the status quo together is represented inside the wide lens in the figure (lightly shaded). If the two parties want to add party 3 to their coalition, then they will restrict the area of status-quo change to the heavily shaded lens (intersection of the preferences of all three).
A different coalition path assumes that parties 1 and 3 get together first. They can select any policy in the intersection of circles 1 and 3 (the heavily shaded area). If these two parties ask party 2 to join them in government, the addition of the new party will not restrict the ability of 1 and 3 to decide on an outcome. Indeed, nothing in the intersection of circles 1 and 3 is excluded by the addition of 2. In other words, adding one veto player in this case does not change the policymaking ability of the initial coalition. Why was policymaking restricted in the first case but not in the second? The reason is that party 2 is located between parties 1 and 3, so it is impossible for the latter two to have a joint preference over the status quo that party 2 will not share. In other words, the addition of a coalition partner with preferences between the extreme coalition partners does not affect policymaking. Put differently still, the following will be tested. One objection to the above argument is that it does not take into account the position of the status quo. One can use Figure 1 to draw the conclusion that the winset of the status quo increases when the status quo is farther away from the party positions. In particular, if the status quo is constrained to be on the same straight line as the ideal points of the parties, then the argument can be made (and was made by one of the referees) that it is "the location of the status quo that matters, rather than range." Yet, the location of the status quo is not identifiable. That is, not only do data that locate parties not locate the status quo in the same space, but also one cannot assume that the status quo was produced by the previous government and, therefore, use the location of that government as a proxy. In many cases, the status quo for any particular law is produced by a compilation of different provisions of laws introduced by different governments, so identifying its location is practically impossible.
COROLLARY (of Propositions
One can make an estimate of the winset of the status quo over the whole range of possible status quo, however. This estimate is negatively related to the range of the coalition, because if the status quo is located within the range of the coalition, its winset is empty. For example, if the whole space is the [0, 1] interval, and a coalition ranges from .5 to 1, then the winset of the status quo will be empty whenever the status quo is located in the [.5, 1] interval. If the range of the coalition shrinks to the [.7, 1] interval, then the winset of the status quo will be empty in only 30% of the cases (assuming a uniform distribution of the status quo). The same argument can be made about the significance of the possible change. If one considers significant laws the ones that move the status quo by more than w, then one would have to add w or 2w to the range in order to find significant changes over the whole range of status quo. Even in this restricted case, the range of a coalition, on the average, will have a negative sign in the calculations of policy change.
Let us now focus on the implications of the corollary for the data set. I (Tsebelis 1995b, 103) state that "since multiparty governments are incapable of producing significant laws (unless there is a dramatic shift in public opinion) while single-party governments are able to undertake such changes, over a long time period and in a wide set of countries one would expect to find more significant pieces of legislation in countries with fewer veto players.... The same argument should apply to government-enacted legislation (decrees)." The argument above is presented in terms of the number of veto players, but on the basis of the model I present here, if the parties are located in the same single dimension, then the argument has to be made on the basis of the ideological distance among the most extreme parties (the range of the necessary coalition). We should then expect fewer significant pieces of legislation in countries with a coalition government that has a large ideological range, and more pieces of significant legislation in countries with a small ideological range (single-party majority or minority governments have a range = 0).
Strictly speaking, in the absence of a generalized shift in public opinion,12 a large coalition (large range) is a sufficient condition for the absence of significant legislation.13 We can visualize and expand the argu-12 When there is a generalized shift, even a universal coalition can enact legislation that expresses this new consensus. 13 But not a necessary condition. Note that the model is deterministic (hence the language of necessary and sufficient conditions). This may appear strange, since we usually assume that the world is probabilistic. But determinism is not an attribute of the world but of the model. In this sense, it falls in the same category with other arguments about necessary conditions (such as Moore's [1966, 418] "no bourgeois, no democracy") as well as with game theoretic models with a single equilibrium (such as the median voter or the prisoners' dilemma, to mention only two). The fact that the model is deterministic does not mean that we can test it as such. There are measurement errors, omitted variables, and so on, that will enable us to keep the model even if we find a few falsifying instances (which will not be the case). In the remainder of this article, when I speak about the theoretical model, I will use the deterministic language; when I speak about empirical tests, I will use the probabilistic one. (Tsebelis 1995a (Tsebelis , 1995b . Since large range (in the absence of a generalized shift in public opinion) is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the absence of significant legislation, the variance (strictly speaking, the residuals) in significant laws will be negatively correlated with the range of a government. Indeed, the possible number of significant laws varies on the left-hand side of the figure (among governments with small ideological range) but not on the right-hand side (among governments with large ideological range). In technical terms, the veto players' theory predicts not only that the ideological range of a government will have a negative effect on the average number of laws but also that the residuals will be heteroskedastically distributed as a function of that range. I single out these expectations and call them hypotheses. There are two other factors that I would expect to affect the production of significant laws. The first is the length of time that a given government stays in office. One would expect that governments take some time before they present significant laws in parliament, consequently, shortlived governments would produce less legislative work. A second factor is alternation of parties in government. A consequence of the argument presented in this section is that a government with a new coalition partner would be expected to make more changes the bigger the ideological distance of the parties that succeed each other in government.
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In other words:
HYPOTHESIS 3: Government duration and alternation of parties have a positive effect on the number of significant laws.
Hypothesis 3 essentially introduces two control variables into hypothesis 1. It is possible that duration of a government is positively associated with production of significant laws, but the rate of production may decline over time. This means that a government will produce more significant laws in the beginning of its term than toward the end. In the third part of this article, I will operationalize and test these predictions. The next step would have been to identify some proxy for importance. Size or length of legislation is inappropriate, because a law can be written to enumerate areas of applicability (in which case length is correlated with significance) or areas of exception (in which case length is negatively correlated with significance). The alternative proxies that come to mind are size of the budget needed for implementation or number of people affected by enactment. Yet, both criteria would indicate that a bill on euthanasia or on same-sex marriage would not be significant. This short discussion indicates that some commonsensical criteria for selection of "significant" laws can yield perverse results.
In the face of this problem, Doering had the brilliant idea of using the Encyclopedia of Labor Law to generate the variable "significant laws." The encyclopedia is edited by Roger Blanpain and is written for labor lawyers from one European country who want to practice law in another. According to the introduction, "National Legislation intends to make available to the subscribers and users of the Encyclopedia pertinent provisions of the most important acts of Parliament, governmental decrees, national, and interindustry wide major collective agreements, or other legal sources, where they cover a country as a whole" (Blanpain Suppl. 194 Blanpain's Encyclopedia also provides a validation test for the NATLEX database, since for the 1981-91 period, all the laws mentioned in Blanpain were included in NATLEX. This was not true before 1981, which, in turn, validates the cutoff point for the study. The dates of promulgation of the significant laws of each country were compared with the dates when governments were in power, so that laws were attributed to the governments that sponsored them.
Governments
The data set on governments included the dates of their beginning and end in the 15 countries of the study (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The study dates (January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1991) were considered the beginning or 15 These choices are described in more detail, along with legal questions that arise when a law is inadequately or insufficiently described in Blanpain, in an essay co-authored by Georgios Trantas, the lawyer who following Doering's idea actually identified the intersection of Blanpain and NATLEX (Scholtz and Trantas 1995 I created a data set of "merged" governments, that is, successive governments with the same composition were considered a single government even if separated by a resignation and/or an election. Obviously, merging affects the values of duration and the number of laws produced by a government. To account for this change, I added the number of laws produced by the different governments to be merged and credited the resulting government with this total number of laws. Duration was recalculated as the sum of the duration of consecutive governments (this excludes possible caretaker governments and periods when a resigned government waits to be replaced, which would have been included if I had recalculated on the basis of the new beginning and ending dates). As a result of merging, the number of cases in the data set decreased from 105 to 58.20 The difference between the merged government data 16 The governments at the beginning and end of the period have been truncated. They lasted longer than indicated, and they may have produced legislation after the period of this study. 17 According to Browne, Gleiber, and Mashoba, "a government is considered terminated whenever: (1) parliamentary elections are held, (2) the head of government changes, (3) the party composition of the government changes, or (4) the government tenders its resignation, which is accepted by the head of state" (Warwick (1994, 28 place all the parties holding seats in his/her national legislature on the Left-Right political spectrum, ranging from zero (ultraleftist) to 10 (ultrarightist), with 2.5 representing the moderate Left, 5 the center, and 7.5 the moderate Right. Castles and Mair presented the results from those countries that had at least three respondents. The ideological score reported for each party was the average of available responses. Given the ten-point scale, the potential range of responses was (0, 10). Of the parties analyzed here, however, the low score was 1.4, received by the Communist Party of France, and the high was 8.2, received by the Gaullist party.
The third index was drawn from Laver and Hunt's (1992) first dimension variable, "increase services vs. cut taxes." Respondents in their study were professional political scientists (Laver and Hunt 1992, 38-41, 122). Each was asked to locate the policy position of both the party leaders and voters for each party in his/her country on the Left-Right spectrum. Respondents were asked to evaluate not only the parties that had won seats in the most recent election but also every party that had won at least 1% of the national vote, as well as any significant regional parties. Laver and Hunt adopted a 20-point scale (to accommodate the fact that the countries in their study had up to 14 parties). For the first dimension-taxes versus public servicesrespondents assigned each party a score ranging from 1 ("promote raising taxes to increase public services") to 20 ("promote cutting public services to cut taxes"). Among the cases included in the data set, the first dimension variable ranged from a low of 2.1 to a high of 17.4.
Only Laver and Hunt included in their study all 15 countries examined here. Warwick did not code the parties of France's Fifth Republic and Greece. In addition, he did not score some government parties in Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. Castles and Mair did not include Luxembourg, Portugal, and Greece.
On the basis of these measures of ideology, I constructed new variables representing the range of each government according to the index as well as the alternation from one government to the next. The range variable was created by taking the absolute value of the distance between the most extreme parties of a coalition. These two parties were usually (but not always) the same for different indices. The correlations among the range variables calculated on the basis of the cases covered by all three indices were quite high.22
The alternation variable was calculated by finding the mid-range position of each government and taking the difference between two successive governments.23 Because this measure was calculated using the previous government, I needed information on the government preceding the one that was in power on January 1, 22 The correlations between any two of these indexes exceeded .8. 23 The formula was (maxgovtl + mingovtl) -(maxgovt2 + mingovt2), where max-and mingovtl are the ideological scores of the preceding government, and max-and mingovt2 are the ideological scores of the "current" government. For instance, if a government succeeded (or "replaced") a government with the same party structure, then all the alternation variables would equal zero.
Again, the three different indices produced highly correlated values of alternation for the cases covered by all three indices.24
The New "Range" and "Alternation" Variables
The range and alternation variables covered different countries and were calculated on the basis of different questions, all of which were relevant to the Left-Right division. In order to preserve the size of the data set, as well as use all the available information, I constructed new measures of range and alternation based on the values of all available indices. I standardized each index and then took the average of the standardized scores that were available for each government. For standardization, I used only the values of the variables for the countries covered by all three indices. This procedure, which was run separately on all three range and alternation variables, resulted in three standardized range and three standardized alternation variables. The average range and alternation variables used all the available information in the following way: In cases for which all three indices existed, the average was calculated on the basis of all three; for countries with two indices, the average was calculated only on the two standardized indices; in the cases covered by one single analyst (Greece), I used that one standardized score. In the regressions I used the absolute value of alternation as calculated above, because it makes no difference whether a left-wing government is replaced by a right-wing government, or vice versa.
In the Appendix I present all the variables discussed above, along with others generated in order to control for other possible effects (government ideology, government control of the legislative agenda, and corporatism; see below).
TESTING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE VETO PLAYERS' THEORY
In this section, I will test all the predictions made in section I. I test hypothesis 1 by regressing the variable Laws (i.e., the number of significant laws and decrees), on the variable Range (average normalized ideological distance of extreme partners of a government coalition, corrected for institutional rules, such as presidential veto power in Portugal). I test hypothesis 2 by analyzing the residuals of the previous regression, more specifically, by testing the squared residuals for heteroskedasticity. I test hypothesis 3 by introducing a series of additional variables: Alternation (absolute value of the difference between average normalized ranges of two successive governments), Duration (years of a government in office), and others that turn out not to be significant (as predicted). There are two reasons for the simultaneous testing of hypotheses 1 and 2. First, since the theory presented here expects heteroskedasticity in model 1, the OLS estimate is inefficient, so model 3 corrects for that. The second and most important point is a general methodological one: When a theory states that high X (in our case, range) is a sufficient but not necessary condition to discourage Y (in our case, low Y is a small number of significant laws), it not only makes a simple prediction about the mean value of Y (number of significant laws) as a function of X (range) but also makes a statement about the variance of Y. It claims that the combination of high X and high Y (large range and large number of significant laws) is unlikely. Consequently, the residuals in the low X area of Figure 2 (low range side) will be large, while the residuals in the high X area (large range) will be small. Translated into statistical terms, this is heteroskedasticity and, as a result, low significance of the test of means (the traditional regression) is possible. But the appropriate test either for a theory about a sufficient but not necessary condition or for a theory identifying necessary (but not sufficient) conditions is a combination of a test of means (regression) with low statistical significance and a test of the variance (residuals) for heteroskedasticity. In the case at hand I have predicted that both the number of significant laws will decline with range (hypothesis 1), and that the (squared or absolute value of the) residuals of the above regression will decline with range (hypothesis 2). If both predictions turn out to be corroborated (as they are), then the confidence in the theory should be significantly higher than might be warranted by the p-value of any one coefficient.
Model 1 provides the bivariate OLS test of hypothesis 1: The relationship between range and laws is negative and significant at the .01 level. Yet, I have proposed that this relationship will be heteroskedastic, and if I am correct, then the estimation of the variance in model 1 is inefficient. In order to correct for this 600 inefficiency, I take the squared residuals from model 1 and regress them on range in model 2. As expected, the coefficient is negative.
Model 2 is not an ordinary regression model, however. In fact, in a nonfinite sample its error term has a nonzero mean, is heteroskedastic, and is correlated across observations. The first and third of these problems disappear in large samples, so we can expect the coefficients estimated by this regression to be consistent (Greene 1997, 559) . This is all that is required in order to correct the inefficient estimation of model 1. Model 3 uses the estimated coefficients from model 2 to correct the variance-covariance matrix in model 1, and it produces efficient estimates. (In practice I used the inverse of the square root of the predicted values from model 2 as weights for a GLS estimation.) Model 3 indicates that the negative relationship between range and laws is significant at the .01 level.
What remains to be shown is that the heteroskedasticity predicted by the theory is present in the data. For reasons explained in the previous paragraph, we cannot use the variance estimated in model 2 because "the finite sample properties of this estimator remain uncertain" (Greene 1997, 559) . A series of homoskedasticity tests can be performed on the residuals, and I will use the weakest of them, introduced by White (1980) . My reasoning is the following: If even the weakest test soundly rejects homoskedasticity, then there is little doubt that the error terms of model 1 are heteroskedastic. According to the White test, the statistic nR2 from model 2 (n is the number of observations) is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998, 158). From model 2 in Table 1 we see that the value of the nR2 statistic is 7.192. From the chi-squared tables with one degree of freedom we obtain a one-tailed value of .00732, which permits the confident rejection of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (at the .01 level).
In summary, from the combination of models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 1 , we find that hypotheses 1 and 2, which indicate a negative and heteroskedastic relationship between range and laws, are both corroborated at the .01 confidence level. More direct evidence is provided by figures 3 and 4. Table 1 ). Figure 4 gives a graphic representation of the absolute value of the residuals from model 1 of Table 1. I 25 I thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion of subdividing the data set. The division applied the definition of minimum winning coalitions (no parties included that are not necessary for a majority) with three exceptions. In Germany I had to take into account the Bundesrat if controlled by the opposition, and in Portugal, the president if his party was not included in the government; and in one case of a government decree in France I took into account the president of the Republic. In all these cases, the standard status of the government was altered to take into account the veto players' theory: for example, in Germany a minimum winning coalition government was coded as oversized if the support of an opposition controlled Bundesrat was required. selected the absolute value for this figure because the graphic of squared residuals is visually misleading (it eliminates small residuals and exacerbates large ones). Again, I divided governments into minimum winning coalitions and all the rest, but this time there is no difference between the regression lines representing the whole data set and each of the two parts. We can see that the slope is negative and very significant, exactly as hypothesis 2 leads us to believe.
Test of Hypothesis 3
The models in this section are multivariate and introduce a series of control variables. According to hypothesis 3, two additional control variables (duration and alternation) are expected to have positive signs. Alternation (the difference between the midpoints of the current from the previous government) is one way to provide a proxy for the status quo in case legislation was introduced by the previous government. Of course, there is no guarantee that this was actually the case. In all multivariate models, heteroskedasticity is significantly reduced. In fact, the White test does not permit rejection of the homoskedasticity assumption at conventional levels of significance. This is why I will correct for heteroskedasticity only the most important of the models from Table 2 . Model 1 in Table 2 introduces both control variables in their linear form. Model 2 introduces the idea of a declining rate of production of significant laws by using the natural logarithm of duration as an independent variable. This model corroborates all the expectations generated by the veto players' theory, which is why I subject it to two more tests. The first examines whether the findings hold for different subsets of the data. Models 2A and 2B separate the different governments into minimum winning coalitions (23 cases) and "others" (minority and oversized coalitions, 35 cases) and retest the model for each of these categories. The second test introduces a series of control variables in order to test for spuriousness of the results. Model 3 introduces three plausible control variables (Agenda Control, Corporatism, and Left Ideology of the government), which the literature suggests as alternative explanations for the findings. As Table 2 shows, all the hypothesized relationships have the correct sign (negative for range and positive for alternation and duration). On the basis of model 2, one can say that the production of significant laws is affected negatively by the ideological range of government and positively by the difference between current and previous government (alternation); furthermore, duration increases the number of laws but at a declining rate.
Models 2A and 2B replicate the analysis for minimum winning coalitions and other governments, respectively. All the signs of the coefficients are as hypothesized, but conventional levels of statistical significance are lost, except for the case of minimum winning coalitions.
Let me now discuss model 3, which introduces three different control variables. The first is agenda control. Doering (1995c) has identified the importance of government agenda setting for both the quantity and quality of legislation produced in a country. In a nutshell, he argues that government control of the agenda increases the number of important bills and reduces legislative inflation (many small bills). Doering defines agenda control in two ways, qualitatively and quantitatively.26 He hypothesizes a positive relationship between significant laws and agenda control. But Doering was discussing countries as units of analysis, and his measures (which I use) refer to countries. Therefore, the variance of significant legislation within each country cannot possibly be captured by Doering's variables.
Corporatism is the second variable introduced for 26 The qualitative measure of agenda control scores countries as follows: (1) The government alone controls the plenary agenda of parliament; (2) the government controls a larger majority in the president's conference (the institution that controls the agenda of the parliament usually comprised of the president and vice-president of the parliament and representatives of parliamentary groups) than it controls in parliament; (3) the president's decision after consultation with party groups cannot be challenged by the chamber; (6) agenda setting is fragmented in the absence of unanimity; (7) the chamber itself determines the agenda (Doering 1995c, 225 In corporatist countries, it is argued, peak associations of employers and unions negotiate working conditions, and only if they do not agree does parliament step in and legislate or the government issue decrees. Because of this, corporatist countries (where ideological range is generally high) presumably produce less significant labor legislation. There are two problems with this argument. First, legislation is produced whether the social partners agree or not. If they agree, then the parliament or the government issues legislation or decrees that confirm the agreement. If they disagree, then the legislative institutions of the country decide on the issue. For example, at the end of the 1980s the problem in both Norway and Sweden was the need to cut wages to prevent unemployment from rising. In Norway, the social partners (unions and employers) agreed to a wage freeze and asked the social democratic minority government to put it into legislation so that it would be universally binding. The legislation was passed by parliament, while the independent unions (i.e., those not affiliated with the main confederation) complained that they were being victimized; wages declined, and unemployment did not grow very much. In Sweden, the social partners failed to agree to control wages, so the social democratic minority government introduced legislation to freeze wages. All the unions protested, the proposal was defeated, the government fell, wages continued to climb rapidly, and unemployment rose much higher than in Norway. Second, if the argument were correct, then one would expect less overall labor legislation in corporatist countries, not just less significant legislation. Yet, corporatist countries have more overall legislation in the area of working time and working conditions.
The third control variable is the ideology of each government. Since the dependent variable is labor legislation, one may assume that left-wing governments produce more of it. In my view, this interpretation ignores the possibility of right-wing governments either repealing labor laws or undoing what left-wing governments have done. Left ideology was measured exactly the same way as range and alternation, so it varies by government, and the empirical results will be conclusive.
As model 3 indicates, none of the control variables has any effect on the results of model 2. The additional three variables come out very close to zero and completely insignificant. In addition, there is no increase in the R of the model, and the adjusted R2 shrinks. It is safe to say that statistically these variables do not explain anything.
Finally, in order to make sure that these results are not generated because of peculiarities in any one country, I examined the points of highest leverage (the four cases), in the upper left quarter of Figure 3 , in order to make sure that they do not reflect unusual situations. These four points represent governments of Belgium, Sweden, Greece, and the United Kingdom. In the case of the first two countries, the governments produced an extraordinary amount of laws because their ideological range was unusually small. In the case of the second two countries, the rule was single-party government, and two of them (both comprised of two or more actual governments) produced a high number of significant laws. Even without these cases, the negative relationship between range and significant laws is preserved, although statistical significance is lost.
Since some of the numbers in the table do not lend themselves to an immediate political interpretation, I will provide one. The numbers will appear "small" because I am dealing with a single area of legislation. One would have to aggregate across different areas to find the overall effect.27
Model 2 corroborates all the predictions of the theory, and additional variables suggested by the literature do not improve upon it. Model 4 replicates model 2 by using GLS (I used the same technique for weighing observations as in Table 1 ). My numerical analysis will be based on model 4, which is both theoretically supported and empirically corroborated. Given that the coefficient of the natural logarithm of duration is positive, we can say that the effect of duration on government legislation is twofold. On the one hand, duration has a positive effect on legislation; on the other, the rate of law production declines with duration.
For the range variable, the coefficient is -.39. The highest normalized value of range is approximately 1.6, while the lowest (any single-party government) is approximately -1.5. The difference between these two governments in their capacity for producing laws is that the single-party government on average produces 1.2 laws more than the largest coalition.
Finally, with respect to alternation, the coefficient (.53) should be interpreted as follows. The highest value of alternation in the data set represents the shift from Callaghan and Labour (recall the wave of strikes in Britain's "winter of discontent") to Thatcher and the Conservatives in 1979, with a value of 3.0 (although 1979 is not in the data set, the government in place before 1981 is required for calculating the value of alternation). The lowest possible alternation (i.e., keeping the ideological range intact from one govern- 27 In this aggregation, one would have to replicate the logic of this analysis, not extrapolate mechanically the results. For example, the positions of government parties on environmental issues should be considered in order to predict environmental legislation, not the Left-Right scale used here. It is perfectly reasonable to expect that a government which is composed of parties close to one another on the the Left-Right scale and which produces many significant laws on labor may produce few significant environmental laws if the veto players are distant from one another in the environmental policy dimension. 604 ment to the next) receives a score of .13. The difference between these two extreme governments in terms of law production is approximately 1.5 significant laws in the area under examination. This is the substantive interpretation of the coefficients.
Let us examine the policy significance of these findings. Taken together, hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 indicate that coalitions with wide ideological range are unlikely to produce significant legislation, while coalitions with small range and single-party governments may or may not. In other words, policy stability is the characteristic of the first, while the possibility of significant policy change is the characteristic of the second. Policy stability is another way of saying that the composition of the government or the political institutions of a country enable political actors credibly to commit that there will be no significant policy changes. This, in turn, reduces the uncertainty for actors in the civil society in making their own decisions. In particular, actors in the economy may make investment decisions without fear that the legislative environment is going to change.
At the other extreme, the possibility for single-party or small-range government to change the status quo significantly may enable a country to adapt more easily to exogenous policy shocks. Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) offer an example in their analysis of tax laws. Once the United States under Reagan reduced taxes for companies and individuals in the highest personal income bracket, other industrialized countries followed. Rates were adjusted by larger or smaller amounts. Among those that made large adjustments were the single-party labor governments of New Zealand and Australia. These governments were leftist (although moderate), and in principle they were not advocates of tax reductions for the rich. Once they decided to decrease taxes, however, partisanship was immaterial: The reductions were comparable to those of Thatcher's Conservative government in the United Kingdom.
This article does not argue in favor of either policy stability or instability. Similarly, it does not argue for government flexibility or credible commitments. Furthermore, governments that take decisive steps and overshoot may then correct their actions, and governments that take small steps may make several at a time and arrive at the same outcome in the long run. The argument is that, depending on government composition (or on institutional structures that consistently produce single or multiple veto players), one can get either policy stability or the potential for policy change, but not both.28 28 Both may occur if a single-party government can find a way to commit credibly, for example, by appointing an independent agency and assigning jurisdiction, or by claiming that the status quo is its own ideal point. I am not going to enter into that discussion. The bottom line is that multiparty governments have difficulty changing the status quo, while single-party governments do not (see the discussion on taxation above).
CONCLUSION
I have presented the implications of the veto players' theory when parties are located in a one-dimensional space, based on data on significant pieces of legislation in 15 West European countries. All the expectations of the theory were corroborated by the data. The number of significant laws varies inversely with the ideological range of governments that produce them (hypothesis 1). In addition, the relation is heteroskedastic with respect to the range of the coalition (hypothesis 2). Each one of these relations is significant at the .01 level, which increases confidence in the theory. The explanation for both these relationships is that a wide range is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the absence of significant legislation. Finally, the number of significant laws increases in proportion to the natural logarithm of government duration (the rate of production declines over tenure) and in proportion to the difference between the ideological position of the current and previous government (hypothesis 3).
With this analysis, the missing empirical link between veto players and a series of important features of parliamentary systems has been established. If there are many veto players separated by large ideological distance, then legislation can only be incremental. If an exogenous shock occurs, a government such as this cannot handle the situation and cannot agree on the necessary policies (unless public opinion is unanimous on the subject). That is why Franzese (1996) found a locked pattern of debt and deficit: Countries with high (low) debt (accumulated deficits) have high (low) deficits. When an exogenous shock creates a pressing problem, the multiparty government unable to handle it will resign and be replaced by government with fewer veto players or narrower ideological range (i.e., a government that can deal with the crisis). This explains the low longevity of multiparty governments established by Warwick (1994) . Similarly, in the absence of political leadership, a series of nonpolitical actors, such as bureaucracies and judges, may step in to fill the void. That is why the judiciary (Alivizatos 1995) or bureaucracies (Lohmann 1998) become more important and independent in countries or in periods with multiparty government.
Finally, it is interesting that in the aggregate (when countries are the units of analysis) more veto players mean less government control of parliamentary agenda. Why is government control of the agenda negatively correlated with a high number of veto players? Is it a coincidental or a causal relation? Several arguments can be made that it is not a mere correlation.
While a causal argument going from agenda control to veto players is difficult to make (most of the time the party system precedes institutional arrangements of agenda control), a strategic one is possible. In countries with strong government control of the agenda, party negotiations for coalition governments will end with a minority government or one with few veto players, because government can use agenda control to produce the outcomes it wants. Conversely, in countries without government agenda control, parties will form oversized coalitions in order to make sure they control the legislature and avoid losing legislative battles by a few votes.
Moving to the reverse side of the argument, a causal connection going from veto players to agenda control is straightforward: When veto players are numerous, they cannot pass through parliament the many and significant pieces of legislation required for agenda control. This argument considers legislation on agenda control to be a collection of significant pieces of legislation. Consequently, we expect not to see agenda control in countries with many veto players, because they cannot pass the legislation required to accomplish this.
A third argument can be made: Veto players and agenda control have common origins. The same sociological and historical factors that fragment a country into many competing parties (none of which has a majority) make these parties suspicious of one another and distrustful of allowing whoever is in government to have significant control over legislation.
In summary, there are three explanations for the negative relationship between number of veto players and government agenda control. One is strategic and views government agenda control as a legislative weapon that reduces the need for veto players. One is causal and connects many veto players with the absence of the significant legislation required for government agenda control. One attributes the connection to common historical and sociological reasons. Which is closer to the truth? This is a major question for further investigation. I  I I  II  I II  III1I1I1II  I  II  II  I  I  I  I 
